Selected article for: "cleavage site and furin cleavage site"

Author: Jo, Wendy K.; de Oliveira‐Filho, Edmilson Ferreira; Rasche, Andrea; Greenwood, Alex D.; Osterrieder, Klaus; Drexler, Jan Felix
Title: Potential zoonotic sources of SARS‐CoV‐2 infections
  • Cord-id: 5e1r52su
  • Document date: 2020_10_23
  • ID: 5e1r52su
    Snippet: The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus‐2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) causing coronavirus disease‐2019 (COVID‐19) likely has evolutionary origins in other animals than humans based on genetically related viruses existing in rhinolophid bats and pangolins. Similar to other animal coronaviruses, SARS‐CoV‐2 contains a functional furin cleavage site in its spike protein, which may broaden the SARS‐CoV‐2 host range and affect pathogenesis. Whether ongoing zoonotic infections are possible
    Document: The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus‐2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) causing coronavirus disease‐2019 (COVID‐19) likely has evolutionary origins in other animals than humans based on genetically related viruses existing in rhinolophid bats and pangolins. Similar to other animal coronaviruses, SARS‐CoV‐2 contains a functional furin cleavage site in its spike protein, which may broaden the SARS‐CoV‐2 host range and affect pathogenesis. Whether ongoing zoonotic infections are possible in addition to efficient human‐to‐human transmission remains unclear. In contrast, human‐to‐animal transmission can occur based on evidence provided from natural and experimental settings. Carnivores, including domestic cats, ferrets and minks, appear to be particularly susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2 in contrast to poultry and other animals reared as livestock such as cattle and swine. Epidemiologic evidence supported by genomic sequencing corroborated mink‐to‐human transmission events in farm settings. Airborne transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 between experimentally infected cats additionally substantiates the possibility of cat‐to‐human transmission. To evaluate the COVID‐19 risk represented by domestic and farmed carnivores, experimental assessments should include surveillance and health assessment of domestic and farmed carnivores, characterization of the immune interplay between SARS‐CoV‐2 and carnivore coronaviruses, determination of the SARS‐CoV‐2 host range beyond carnivores and identification of human risk groups such as veterinarians and farm workers. Strategies to mitigate the risk of zoonotic SARS‐CoV‐2 infections may have to be developed in a One Health framework and non‐pharmaceutical interventions may have to consider free‐roaming animals and the animal farming industry.

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