Pandemic Politics: Timing State-Level Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19

Christopher Adolph; Kenya Amano; Bree Bang-Jensen; Nancy Fullman; John Wilkerson

Evidence from the 1918 influenza pandemic underscores the stakes for elected officials. In that earlier natural experiment, American cities faced similar decisions regarding social distancing policies. For example, Philadelphia decided to hold a parade welcoming soldiers returning from World War I, while St. Louis cancelled its parade, and ultimately experienced one eighth as many deaths per capita during that wave of influenza. The height of the infection in Saint Louis was two months later than in Philadelphia, and was far lower, with deaths peaking at fifty per hundred thousand rather than 250 per hundred thousand.(11; 12) Shortly after community transmission of the coronavirus was discovered in Washington and California in late February 2020, public health experts drew the comparison between Philadelphia and Saint Louis, hoping to inspire policymakers to promote social distancing. Nevertheless, in an echo of the decisions made a century before, there are significant differences in the timing of governors' decisions to mandate social distancing. For instance, on 6 March 2020, after Kentucky had its first confirmed case of COVID-19, Governor Andy Beshear (D) immediately called a state of emergency, encouraged social distancing, and closed bars and restaurants ten days later. But when neighboring Tennesse uncovered its first confirmed case of COVID-19 on March 5th, Governor Bill Lee (R) waited until 12 March to declare a state of emergency and finally closed restaurants and bars on 22 March. (13) Why did governors' responses to a sudden, shared threat differ? Under normal circumstances, governors' policy decisions are shaped by the national leaders and agenda of their political party and the demands of their own constituents, particularly those in their partisan base. Governors may also look to innovative peers and neighbors for examples to follow. But the fast-moving nature of the coronavirus threat, the need to rely on experts to understand complex scientific material, and uncertainty about the nature and scope of the threat might scramble all or some of these usual motivations. pandemic politics · Adolph, Amano, Bang-Jensen, Fullman & Wilkerson The public health case for mandatory social distancing in the United States developed quickly in the wake of the first reports of community transmission on 26 February in Washington state. One might expect social distancing measures to quickly follow across the fifty states, perhaps more quickly in states with greater number of confirmed cases. But mandating social distancing is a difficult decision for any political leader. If these measures are successful in preventing widespread mortality, many members of the public who suffered the costs of these mandates may never fully comprehend the benefits. Indeed, the more successful the intervention, the more likely it will appear to many as an "overreaction." Moreover, some states faced higher potential costs from these policies: closing schools is more painful in states where more children depend on schools for subsidized lunches and shutting restaurants and public places is more difficult in states highly dependent on tourism. (14) More generally, states with more limited economic resources are likely far less able to weather the deprivations caused by economic shutdowns, or to expand social insurance protections during mandated social distancing, and thus may be considerably more reluctant to take these steps.