Quarantine, isolation and the duty of easy rescue in public health

Giubilini, Alberto; Douglas, Thomas; Maslen, Hannah; Savulescu, Julian

Some formulations of the duty of easy rescue do require that individuals be subject to quarantine and isolation in such cases. One such formulation has been provided by Singer, according to whom the example of the drowning child suggests that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’.29 Call this the duty of comparatively easy rescue. According to it, there is a moral obligation to sacrifice something when the moral relevance of this sacrifice is small compared to the moral relevance of the good to be achieved, rather than when the cost is small in absolute terms. So that principle can still morally demand making moderate or even great sacrifices, such as submitting to quarantine or isolation even when the conditions are very harmful to individuals, where there is something of significantly greater moral importance at stake. One might think that the duty of comparatively easy rescue is too demanding. The state might well have reasons to enforce coercive and compulsory public health measures, but it is more difficult to accept the idea that individuals have a moral obligation, based on a duty of easy rescue, to submit to quarantine and isolation, given the great cost involved. If we think individuals have uncontroversial moral duties of easy rescue, the general formulation of the duty of easy rescue needs to be less demanding than the one offered by Singer.