Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Experiments with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential, Such as Influenza Virus: a Call for a Science-Based Discussion

Casadevall, Arturo; Imperiale, Michael J.

For the near horizon, a conference sponsored by neutral parties appears to be one mechanism for further communication about which both parties appear agreeable. We are optimistic that most people in the pro-and anti-GOF camps are believers that information, discussion, and reason can lead the way to the best solutions to the intricate problems posed by this research. Despite all the uncertainties about risks and benefits, there must be a riskbenefit calculation, with proponents providing their reasons for benefit and opponents their assessment of risk. Obviously, one way to help achieve a consensus is for benefits of the work to be clearly articulated and for the risks to be minimized. For example, it may be helpful to revisit the biocontainment regulations to ascertain whether existing protocols are adequate or should be modified, keeping in mind that it is impossible to decrease the risk of an accident to zero. However, we must also face the possibility that there will be no consensus in this matter. If an impasse develops, it will be important to channel the debate into different areas of discourse. For example, if pro-and anti-GOF research proponents reach an impasse, perhaps the debate could refocus on identifying Editorial the important questions in influenza virus research that both groups feel should be answered and in finding new creative experimental alternatives that satisfy both camps. Looking at the farther horizon, the influenza virus research community should consider making safer laboratory strains that would further mitigate the possibility of harm should lab accidents occur (27) . Finally, we note that although this article and much of the debate are focused on HPAIV and PPP research, the issues considered here are relevant to the larger fields of microbiology and infectious diseases and that the outcome of these discussions will echo in other fields. It is possible that the GOF debate represents a historical moment for research in the microbiology community comparable to the advent of recombinant DNA technology in 1975 that led to the Asilomar conference. We note that the decisions made during and after Asilomar resulted in society's reaping the benefits of the molecular biology revolution, including many new therapies made possible by recombinant DNA technology (11) . Given the potential threats posed by PPP and the capacity of this debate to affect the course of microbiological research in the 21st century, we must get this right. We are confident that the scientific community can tackle this problem in a manner that will maximize our ability to continue to generate important knowledge that will protect the public in the future.